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I 
It is already old news that with the gradual increase of yearly built 
tonnage of ships in post-war Japan, in 1956, she was able to reach the top, 
surpassing Great Britain which had always maintained the lead. (see chart 1). 
The supremacy of the Japanese giant corporations that control shipbuilding 
industry can be clearly seen by the fact that, in 1956, six out of ten top 
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® "There have been important changes in the world pattern of shipbuilding since 
the war. The chart shows the comparative tonnage of merchant shipping launched 
by the main shipbuilding countries in the years 1938 and 1957-last year's huge 
figw-e for Japan is too great to be accommodated on the chart. An article in the 
British Iron and . Steel Federation's quarterly, .. Steel Review," published yesterday, 
points out that British yards have been handicapped in recent years by a shortage 
of steel plate, and by labour troubles. II If these could 'be overcome an annual 
output capacity of at least 1,750,000 tons could be acbieved, possibly more." But 
as the chart shows, competition from foreign yards is increasing sharply. (Figures 
from Lloyd's Regi,ter of Shipping.)" 
* The Assistant Professor of Economics at Kansai Univen;ity. 
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shipbuilding yards in the world were Japanese yards." 
When comparing the volume of newly built tonage of pre-war Japan 
and post-war days, in 1951, it was already over the level of pre-war days as 
shown in Table 1. If the volume of output is considered an index to the 
development of the industry, it. can be said that the shipbuilding industry 
Table I. Tonnage of Newly Built Ships (over 100 tons) 
Year I Total I Cargo I ~:;.I Passenger I Tanker I Special I Fishing I Export I 
1934 145 86.4 15.8 7.1 19.3 10.9 5.3 -
35 142 92.9 20.9 2.8 17.9 5.0 3.0 -
36 428 127.0 35.6 2.5 51.0 9.4 21.3 -
37 247 262.6 66.9 1.5 38.0 16.7 42.5 -
38 401 287.4 11.2 1.3 32.3 22.9 46.0 -
39 333 215.2 49.8 
-
56.0 9.8 2.6 
-
40 307 202.0 79.0 3.5 13.5 7.1 2.1 -
41 241 161.8 36.5 13.5 9.2 17.2 2.9 -
42 293 188.0 34.4 
-
20.3 46.6 3.8 -
43 801 368.2 29.7 0.9 266.1 138.8 0.8 -
44 1,730 958.5 
- 0.4 673.9 92.1 5.5 -
45 608 455.8 
- 0.4 99.4 49.7 2.3 -
46 118 80.2 
- -
16.2 7.3 13.9 
-
47 64 39.8 
-
1.6 1.5 6.8 14.4 -
48 163 89.4 20.0 27.5 1.1 25.5 17.0 0.8 
49 159 140.4 - - 10.0 1.2 3.7 3.7 
50 227 105.8 - - 37.7 3.1 4.3 76.0 
51 443 313.2 - 0.9 62.3 10.4 20.7 35.2 
52 504 356.6 8.4 0.3 104.7 4.2 6.3 23.5 
53 707 233.8 - 0.8 152.7 2.3 10.6 306.9 
54 412 171.7 10.6 0.9 83.8 2.7 32.0 110.9 
55 502 177.7 1.5 0.2 15.3 8.8 37.6 261.4 
56 1,529 259.1 2.0 0.3 98.7 1.6 48.8 1,119.0 
Note; CD Source: Transportation Ministry, Statistical Handbook of Shipping, 1957. 
® Unit: 1,000 g. t., for warships; 1,000 di,pl. tons. 
1) No. 1 Mitsubishi Shipbuilding & Engineering., Nagasaki 
No. 2 Deutsche Werft, Hamburg 
No. 3 Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy-Industries" Yokohama 
No. 4 Gotawerken, Goteborg 
No. 5 Harima Shipbuilding & Engineering" Aioi 
No. 6 Kawasaki Dockyard Co., Kobe 
No. 7 Eriksbergs Werft, Goteborg 
No. 8 Mitsubishi Heavy-Industries, Reorganized., Kobe 
No. 9 Kieler Howaldtswerke 
No. 10 Hitachi Shipbuilding & Engineering, Innoshima 
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had recovered the pre-war level in that year when the demand for ships was 
incresed by the Korean War and in which orders were given twice during 
the Seventh Shipbuilding Progam. Moreover, in 1956, the volume of con-
struction nearly came up to that of 1944 (during the war) which was the 
peak in the history of Japanese shipbuilding and in 1957, it went beyond 
this level. It is certain that the shipbuilding industry has now attained a 
level that is far beyond that of pre-war days. 
But the recovery in the shipbuiliding industry in this sense does not mean 
that it has returned to a situation similar to that of pre-war days. It is 
necessary to note the fact that fundamental conditions in the shipbuilding in-
dustry have greatly changed whereas the volume of output has increased. 
Table 2. Tonnage of Existing Merchant Ships (over 100 tons) 
Year 
I Total I Cargo (Dec.) 
1934 3,862.0 2,730.9 
35 3,889.8 2,716.4 
36 4,051.2 2,809.5 
37 4,408.3 3,078.9 
38 .5,038.4 3,628.9 
39 5,382.4 3,893.2 
40 5,682.7 4,121.7 
41 6,094.3 4,424.1 
42 5,366.5 3,796.7 
43 4,764.1 3,242.6 
44 3,581.4 2,217.4 
45 1,344.1 987.1 
46 1,384.9 1,024.4 
47 1,468.1 1,087.7 
48 1,554.9 1,132.1 
49 1,683.6 1,227.2 
50 1,711.4 1,240.4 
51 2,282.7 1,742.6 
52 2,734.9 2,143.7 
53 3,046.0 2,286.0 
54 3,292.7 2,434.0 
55 3,394.9 2,551.0 
56 3,724,6 2,827.2 
57 4,050.9 3,109.1 
(Jun.) 
Note; CD Source: Same as Table I. 
® Unit: 1,000 g. t. 
I 
Cargo & 
I Passenger I Tanker Passenger 
875.4 125.4 130.1 
889'8 128.3 155.4 
908.6 137.6 195.5 
944.1 142.1 243.3 
960.9 145.0 303.6 
1,006.3 113.0 369.9 
1,042.1 141.3 377.6 
1,134.6 134.7 400.8 
1,023.4 119.7 426.6· 
839.2 84.8 597.4 
458.2 81.8 824.0 
113.5 75.1 168.4 
113.5 75.1 171.8 
124.5 75.8 180.1 
155.3 70.5 197.0 
131.9 77.6 246.9 
112.3 77.9 280.9 
94.2 73.4 372.4 
80.9 62.7 447.6 
107.2 56.3 596.4 
123.0 52.7 683.0 
118.4 51.5 674.3 
109.7 51.3 . .736.5 
111.0 51.7 779.1 
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The first among the changes is the remarkable decrease in the construction 
of warships. It is said that a displacement ton in warships is equal to four 
gross tons in merchant ships. It may be seen from Table 1 that the volume 
of warships which was comparatively large as explained above, formed a· 
fairly large part in the total volume of ships built during the war. In pre-
war days, also, for example, in the period from 1926 to 1931, the percentage 
of warships built in private yards was 42% to 58% of merchant ships.') But 
as seen from Table I, it had decreased to a very small amount after the war. 
Second, is the weakened situation of Japanese shipping. As shown in 
Table 2, the tonnage of Japanese ships which was 6 million gross tons and 
placed third in the world after Great Britain and the U. S. in 1941, ,that is 
just before the war, diminished to 1300 thousand gross tons at the end of 
the war. Moreover, with the withdrawal of government indemnification of 
war losses, shipping companies lost their accumulated capital at one stroke 
and their independent revival or recovery after the war was made difficult.') 
In addition to this difficulty, the monopolistic control by the Shipping 
Control Association continued in the period just after the war and overseas 
shipping was prevented by foreign trade control by the Occupation Forces. 
The full scale revival of Japanese shipping, such as the return to private 
administration since 1950 and the construction of large-sized ocean going 
ships which began with the Fifth Shipbuilding Program in 1949 was made 
possible by financial assistance from government banks and government counter-
part funds. This showed an unprecedented weak situation in Japanese ship-
ping. Moreover, the volume of construction was from 20 to 30 thousand 
tons per year and it could hardly match the shipbuilding capacity.') 
The recovery of the shipping industry through the Planned Shipbuilding 
Program was financed entirely by governmental funds and by borrowing from 
commercial banks. Therefore, the sum of borrowed money has accumulated 
with the progress of Planned Shipbuilding and the sum borrowed for fixed 
equipment came up to 185.5 billion yen at the end of September 1957.') 
The enormous amount of interest payment has reduced the power to win 
the freight rate competition and with the fall in the market rate of freight, 
and excess of ships has been caused, though the tonnage of existing ships is 
still behind the pre-war level. 
2) See K. Echigo; lapanese Shipbuilding Industry, p. 50. 
3) Total loss incurred to all shipping companies in Japan due to withdrawal of government 
indemnification of war losses which amounted to approximately 2, 450 million yen. This 
amount was over three time the sum of the paid capital of the main twenty companies at 
that time. 
4) For details, see ibid. p. 63. 
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The first among the changes in fundamental conditions in the Japanese 
shipbuilding industry is the completely weakened and narrowed domestic ma-
rket for shipbuilding. 
On the other hand, her shipbuilding capacity has greatly increased beyond 
that of pre-war days. "For the Japanese shipbuilding industry, in which it 
was a rule that the industry had always expanded with wars, the World 
War II was no exception. This may be seen from the fact that the number 
of yards with the building capacity of over 1,000 tons increased from 41 in 
1940, to 56 in 1944 and the number of berths of the same capacity incre-
ased from 126 to 133 and the number of docks increased from 70 to 78 
during the same years. And most of those yards escaped damage from 
bombing and of removal for reparations, they were left intact in the period 
after the war:) The number of companies which was 24 in 1937 increased 
to 49 in 1949 and after that it has shown additional changes (3 I in 1950, 
34 in '51, 33 in '52, 38 in '53, 40 in '54 and 47 in '55). The increase in 
the building capacity and in the number of shipbuilding companies are among 
the second of changes. 
The facts mentioned above, i. e. the weakened and narrowed domestic 
market and on the contrary, the increased building capacity and number of 
companies, have naturally caused the keenest competition among shipbuilding 
companies. 
Under the strengthened competition, even big companies could not be 
Table 3. The Degree of Concentration of output in Top Ten Compames 
I 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
I. Mitsubishi Shipbuilding & Engineering. 14.7 IB.4 13.4 15.6 19.4 16.6 
2. Hitachi Shipbuilding & Engineering. 12.1 11.7 11.1 9.7 B.7 11.6 
3. Harima Shipbuilding & Engineering. 11.0 7.B 12.5 6.8 7.1 7.5 
4. Japan Steel & Tube Corp. 4.5 5.8 3.7 9.0 6.1 13.3 
5. Kawasaki Dockyard Co. 11.3 12.3 5.9 13.0 5.8 9.B 
6. Mitsubishi Heevy-Industries. Reorganized. 9.4 9.3 10.7 5.9 5.4 6.8 
7. Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy.Industries. 12.3 7.2 10.4 4.1 4.9 2.4 
8. Ishikawajima Heavy-Industries. 1.6 4.2 2.B 2.0 4.2 1.4 
9. Mitsui Shipbuilding & Engineering. 11.4 7.4 6.1 7.1 4.0 B.9 
10. Uraga Dock Co. 5.B 6.2 2.7 6.3 2.2 3.1 
Total 94.1 90.3 83.2 79.5 67.8 81.4 
Total for all Japan 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Committee for Fair Trade; Actual Conditions of Economic Concentration 'n Iapan 
lndustr; .... 
5) Transportation Ministry; White Paper on Shipping, July, 1958. 
6) K. Echigo; ibid. p. 180. 
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safe as in the past. Moreover, with the law against excessive concentration 
of economic power, the Mitsubishi Heavy-Industries. Comp., which had been 
at the top was divided into three companies and the influence or power 
held by the top company in the industry was decreased. Therefore, though 
the total output has been already restored to the pre-war level, .the degree 
of concentration in production among shipbuilding companies has become 
less than that of pre-war days in which (1937) ten top companies produced 
96.7 % of total output as shown in Table 3. 
Here it became necessary for big companies in the shipbuilding industry 
to make strong efforts to secure orders and to expand markets as matters of 
survival. As shown in Chart 2 the strong post-war shipbuilding policies as 
well as compulsory measures to create a domestic market by Planned Shipbuil-
ding, have been nothing but a part of the results of strong movements 
among big shipbuilding companies to expand the market by exhortation, 









Note: Handbook for Shipbuilding, 1947, p. 115. 
Chart. 2. 
Export·lmport Bank 
At the same time, each giant shipbuilding companies has been forced 
to take up measures to promote so-called groupings among companies by 
firmly combining with particular shipping companies and by reorganizing 
the shipping industry which will be explained below, in order to expand 
and stabilize the quantity of received orders. On the other hand, it has been 
forced to launch into so-called many-sided production in order to compensate 
for the fall in relative status in the field of new shipbuilding, by production 
III other fields than shipbuilding. 
However, the increased shipbuilding capacity has not been met with the 
7) For instance~ the so-called shipbuilding bribery Case. 
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amount of orders which has been received by the competition in the weakened 
and narrowed domestic market. Receiving orders form foreign countries is 
almost the only way to solve this problem, for the present. Therefore, giant 
shipbuilding companies have been forced to strive to get orders from foreign 
countries. Substantial policies for export promotion by the government, for 
example, measures called a link system, by which the losses caused by unpro-
fitable orders were made up by profits gained from the import of raw sugar, 
were a reflection of government policy upon the intentions of giant com-
panies.') 
In order to get orders for ships from foreign countries, first of all, the 
productive costs have to be decreased so as to compensate for the high price 
of steel which has naturally been caused by the foreign trade structure in 
the post-war days. For this purpose, the large-scale rationalization in which 
the introduction of new techniques, mainly in welding, is the most important, 
has been almost inevitable. The increase in "labour intensification" and 
exploitation of small and medium-scaled companies connected with monopo-
listic companies have been an important part of rationalization. 
The increase in output over the pre-war level, as mentioned above, was 
attained by getting orders from foreign countries which was made possible 
by the rationalization. Also productive activities of Japanese shipbuilding 
industry have been carried out under a different market structure from that 
of pre-war days.') 
In the following pages, problems of the revival of monopolistic companies 
in the shipbuilding industry will be concretely analysed, focusing on ration-
alization and combination or grouping·.··· ·the symbols of revival which were 
factors to bring about the revival. 
n 
In table 4, changes in the price of ships which show the conclusive 
results of rationalization in the post-war days, are shown. If the price of 
ships built under the Fifth Shipbuilding Program in 1949, is taken as the 
basis, the rise in price was only 25 % in the case of the ships built under 
8) See Echigo; Changed and Characteristics of Japan", Shipbuilding Induslry in the Post-War 
Days, Kansai University, Economic Review, Vol. :1, No.4. 
9) In the period before World War 11, in this country, the only case of shipbuilding for 
expon in which constructed ships of 370,000 dead weight ton for the V. S, during World 
War I according to "exchange agreement of ships with steel between U. S. and Japan:' 
In other words, this industry in the pre-war days was developed for the domestic market. 
But in the post-war days, particularly after 1956, 70--80 % of the total of newly constructed 
tonnage has been exportod. and the main market has been completely different from that of 
pre-war days. 
Table 4. Change in the Price of Ships 
The 5th 6th 7th 7th 8th 9th 9th 10 th II th 12 th 13th Program (first) (second) (first) (second) 
. Standard price of heavy 
J plate (per ton) (17,300 yen) 
Steel 100 190 288.0 288.0 282.0 270.0 214.0 222.0 255.0 298.0 334.0 
t (3,600T) 
Amount used 100 98.9 97.2 94.5 92.8 92.8 92.8 83.4 83.4 80.6 80.6 
(100 yen) 
ManUfa.{Unit cost (per hour) 100 150.0 155.0 170.0 200.0 220.0 250.0 280.0 270.0 273.0 313.0 
0 cturing Number of working hours (l,015,000H) 




c.J (8,885 yen) ~ 
:4 Average monthly income for labourer 100 106.0 123.5 148.5 167.0 182.0 192.0 212.0 251.0 275.0 248.2 
(15,000 yen) 
The plice of main engines (per h. p.) 100 120.0 160.0 186.5 200.0 186.5 173.0 147.0 126.5 160.0 233.3 
(79,900 yen) 
The price of ships (per g. t.) 100 105.0 144.0 204.0 195.0 185.0 151.0 129.0 125.2 137.6 170.7 
The price index average 
{wholesale price 100 126.5 144.0 168.8 163.5 164.0 166.5 161.0 163.0 166.5 178.2 
metal & machiness 100 187.5 229.2 316.4 303.7 279.2 276.0 248.0 264.0 299.0 343.9 
Note; <D The cargo ship of 7,000 g.t. with Diesel engines of 5,000 h.p. taken as standard in this tables. 
® Source; Same as Table 1. 
'" 
..,. 
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the 11 th Program (1955), in spite of the remarkable rise, by 2.55 times, in the 
price of steel which is the main part of the cost of a ship. On the other 
hand, the rise in the standard price of ships in Britain was 72 % in the 
period from 1949 to 1955. The remarkable rise in the price of ships in the 
world, particularly in Britain, and the relative fall in the price of ships in 
Japan which was caused by rationalization were the main reasons for the 
increase in export of ships, as well as the rapid delivery (because there was 
more room in berths owing to the small domestic market.) 
It can be said that measures for rationalization consisted not only in 
the decrease in the quantity of used materials which was caused by the 
improvement in welding methods and by the introduction of the block-
building method or in the decrease in the number of necessary working hours 
to build a ship caused by the rise in productivity, but also the decrease in the 
quantity of used materials and in the number of working hours which was 
caused by great "labour intensification" or the strengthening of exploita-
tion of related small scale companies by the use of a strong bargaining 
pOSItIOn. Of course, the rise in labour productivity must be distinguished 
from the increase in "labour intensification." The former is related to the 
utility value and yields the same value (in the sense of labour-value 
theory) during the same working hours. The latter yields more value during 
the same working hours, because the increased quantity of used labour, 
though the former lowers the value per unit of commodity. 
But in the actual process of production, aiming directly at lowering cost, 
the two things mentioned above, usually are carried out, closely combined 
with each other. Therefore, it is difficult to clearly. discern the two kinds 
of effect. According to statistics, we must be careful of the fact that even 
the increase in output and the decrease in production cost which are really 
not results of the rise in the labour productivity, are often explained purposely 
as a result of the rise in productivity. 
As shown in Table 5 and 6, in spite of the increase in tonnage of 
launched ships by about three times in the period from 1953 to 1956, while 
the number of labourers increased from 79,000 to only 110,000 and monthly 
working hours per man increased from 198 to only 213, and the tonnage of 
launched ships per man greatly increased. But this fact is not only the 
result as often stated, of the increase in labour productivity but the result 
of the combined effect of the increase in labour productivity, " labour inten-
sification " and the degree of dependence upon sub-contracted work to be 
given to .small-scaled companies. 
K. ECHIGO 













jun~ dec. jun. jun. dec. jun. 
Regular Employees 59.319 61,512 61,713 59.863 59.308 61,816 
Temporary Emp. 10,124 6,651 4,931 3,745 7,592 10,105 
Sub- Cont. Emp. 9,116 9,467 8,361 11,655 18,641 25,751 
Total 78,559 77,630 75,005 75,263 85,541 97,672 
Note; CD Source; Department of Shipping of Transportation Ministry. 
® In this investIgation, 25 yards were chosen. 








I Tonnage of I launched ships(I,OOOt) Monthly working hours per man I Month I y wage I payment in cash (yen)1 
1952 I 582 I 197.8 I 18,393 
1953 I 458 I 197.9 i 21,027 I 
1954 I 303 I ·192.2 I 21,654 I 
1955 I 736 I 204.1 I 24,649 
1956 I 1,544 I 212.5 I 28,242 
Note: CD Source; Same as Table 5. 








According to a common. view, the history of rationalization, which brought 
about the rise in labour productivity, can be divided into three periods. The 
first is the period, from 1950 to the next year, in which rivetting was changed 
to welding; the second is the period until 1953 or '54 in which the block-
building method was adopted; the third is the period after 1955 in which 
production equipment such as berths were enlarged, as newly built ships 
became larger and larger. 
If we look at the statistical data of investment for fixed capital, shown 
in Table 7, and if we ignore, for the present, the item titled, "machines" 
which, as will be explained below, reflects the expansion of equipment for 
manufacturing frames and the advance of many-sided production in the post-
war days, it is clearly seen that the main part of investments have been· for 
the expansion of equipment for processing and assembling the body of ships 
(welding) and of equipment for conveying and electric power_ supply neces-
sitated by the block-building method. It can be seen that the investment 
for berths greatly increased in 1955, for the first time. 
· 
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Table 7. Fixed Investment a.nd Financial Sources (%) 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 Total 
1. Equipment for 'trocessing and 
assembling (we ding) ship body······ 10.S 19.7 24.9 13.1 9.1 20.0 13.2 16.2 
2. Equipment for conveying . .............. 9.3 18.3 20.3 17.4 8.1 19.1 17.9 17.0 
3. Docks . ......... , ............................... 1.6 1.2 13.2 4.7 2.9 0.7 1.2 3.4 
4. Quays .......................................... 1.8 2.6 0.6 5.1 5.3 1.8 3.5 3.0 
5. Berth . ......................................... 2.3 3.4 7.5 0.5 2.5 13.3 10.5 7.3 
6. Sources of Electric Supply············ .. · 4.0 4.3 4.4 2.9 1.2 3.7 3.1 3.2 
7. Machines······································· 33.0 30.6. 15.8 35.1 38.8 22.1 29.7 28.4 
S. Equipment for indirect uses for 
production .................................... 15.3 6.8 4.7 8.2 16.9 7.7 11.1 9.5 
9. Others .......................................... 21.9 13.1 8.6 13.0 15.2 11.6 10.1 12.0 
Total .......................................... 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1. Increase in Capital ..................... 4.3 2.2 16.7 12.2 5.1 3.6 21.3 11.5 
II. Reserve······································· 10.0 18.5 34.6 36.0 57.9 43.2 45.2 39.1 
III. Borrowing from Commercial 
Banks ....................................... 40.1 31.8 25.8 20.6 IS.4 49.3 22.7 29.5 
IV. Borrowing form Industrial 
Development Bank···· .................... 0.7 14.7 17.3 15.8 8.8 2.4 2.9 8.1 
V. Bonds . ...................................... 44.7 32.8 5.6 5.4 9.8 1.5 7.9 11.8 
Total··········································1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: CD Source : The investigation by Department of Shipping, Transportation Ministry. 
® Figure in the table show total of main 19 factories. 
® Figw-es in lower table show the financial sources, 
Changes in production methods which were caused by the introduction 
of welding and the block-building method can be diagramatically described 
as follows: (~shows the route of transportation) 
In rivetting: 
materials ~ drawing ~ boring ~ cutting ~ bordering ~ gouging 
~ shaping ~ fitting ~ boring ~ gouging ~ rivetting --->- packing. 
In welding: 
materials---->-drawing ___ cutting by gas--->- bordering --->- shaping--->-
assembling on the ground --->- welding --->- fitting --->- welding. 
Beside the fact that the process of production has been simplified as shown 
· above, (I) it is needless to say that, by the welding method, it is not neces-
sary in drawing on materials to indicate by indenting in advance, positions 
to be rivetted and work has been generally simplified by this method. 
Therefore there has been a decrease in the number of working hours per 
unit of output by 30 %. If monopol gas cutting machines which have 
· been recently imported from Gennariy, are used drawing is not necessary at 
all. (2) processes of boring, gouging and fitting-frames have been onunitted. 
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(3) the welding method made the block-building method possible. While 
the latter made the former most effective. 
In other words, according to the traditional production method, first of 
all, the keel was laid and cross-plates fitted and then bulk-heads on the inside 
floor, ribs, outside boards, beams and decks were fitted, conveying materials 
one by one to the berths. But according to the new block-building method, 
a ship is devided into several blocks and after each block has been constr-
ucted on the ground by the most convenient method, the constructed blocks 
are conveyed to the berths and assembled. By this method, work on berths 
have been simplified and the reliability of welding has increased and the 
number of working hours per unit of output has greatly decreased. Hence, 
with the increase in "labour intensification," the number of working hours 
per unit of output has remarkably decreased in 1957 by half, compared 
with that of 1949, as shown in Table 4. 
The remarkable decrease in the number of working hours per unit of 
output has resulted in the decrease in the necessary number of days for 
assembling a ship on a berth, in the rise in the rate of turnover of capital 
and actually in the increase in the shipbuilding capacity on a berth. For 
instance, the fact that the shipbuilding capacity in Japan which was estimated 
at 800,000 g. t. in the Strike Report, has increased to 2,500,000 g. t. in the 
last two or three years, was caused not only by the enlargement of berths 
mentioned above but also by the shortening of the period of shipbuilding 
on a berth (the decrease in the number of working hours) which differs from 
physical expansion. In this sense, it is said that investment for rationalization 
in the first and second periods mentioned above contributed to the increase 
in the capacity for production as well as that in the third period. 
In addition to such a process to reduce the productive cost, that is 
investment for rationaIization~improvement in building method~rise 
in productivity~decrease in the number of working hours per unit of 
output~reduction of cost: improvements in building methods have directy 
brought about the reduction of the necessary amount of steel per unit of 
output. As shown in Table 4 a reduction was realized by about 20% in 
the period from 1949 to 1957. 
Here, we must note the fact that innovations in techniques and impro-
vements in building methods which were caused by the rationalization in 
production equipment in post-war days as explained above, were rapidly 
carried out and brought about outstanding effects in only a few years after 
1950 in which a certain amount of orders was received. This fact shows 
that reduction of shipbuilding· costs by the introduction of new techniques 
was the most important and urgent problem for monopolistic shipbuilding 
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companies and the progress of their own techniques, equipment and experience 
which made it possible, had already attained a high level. 
These techniques, equipment and experience had been gained from none 
other than the Japanese Navy which heavily supported this industry in pre-
war days and in war-time. For instance, the research and the practice of 
electric welding carried out by the Japanese Navy was so intensive that it 
was often said, "Japanese Navy, accordingly electric welding." The Navy 
applied for the first time in 1928, the welding method to large-sized warships. 
After the" Fourth fleet case," the Navy continued its research and came to 
apply it with confidence to a battleship and an aircraft carrier at the time 
before the war. 
As mentioned above, warship building occupied a fairly large part in 
the total output of private yards in the pre-war days and in war-time. 
Shipbuilding equipment and shipbuilding engineers who made progress in 
their techniques and experience by warship building were left untouched 
after the collapse of the Japanese Navy. In a word this industry imported 
new techniques from foreign countries in the post-war days, in addition to 
its inheritance from militaristic Japanese capitalism. 
The world's record in the reduction of the number of working hours per 
unit of output that was made in the construction of the battleship" Yamato," 
·of 70,000 tons, the number of working hours for which equaled that for an 
aircraft carrier of 30,000 tons shows that a certain method of block-building 
had already been applied in its construction. During the occupation, N. B. 
e. (National Bulk Carrier) in the U. S. showed keen interest in the excellent 
equipment by which "Yamato" had been built. The fact that large-sized, 
shipbuilding at leased Kure Navy Arsenal yielded better results by the com-
pany than expected, shows how great the inheritance was. Similar fact can 
be seen in any giant private yard as well as in former Navy Arsenals. 
The second point to be noted is the fact, as shown in Table 7, of sources 
of funds for investments in durable equipment, that half of the funds 
obtained consist of outside borrowing and above all, the borrowing from 
commercial banks amounts to as high as 30%. This shows that the invest-
ments in equipment which were necessary for the rapid development of 
technical innovations could never be made without depending upon the banks. 
Therefore, the rationalization of equipment has made great progress only 
under the monopolistic shipbuilding companies in which as will be mentioned 
hereafter, banking, shipbuilding and shipping concerns are tightly combined. 
As mentioned before, the expansion of welding facilities began in 1950 
or thereabouts in the big shipyards but there was a time lag of several years 
.to begin with in small and medium-sized yards. It was only 3 or 4 years 
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ago, when taking advantage of the so-:alled" "shipbuilding boom" which 
started in the fall of 1954, the fonner need not have encroached on the 
market of the latter, that the investments in equipment have spread to the 
·small or· medium-sized companies. Before that time, they could not afford 
the minimum level of repairs of necessary equipment, much less the ration-
alization of equipment and having been abandoned by the banks, their 
facilities had been left to deteriorate. 
Now, the rise of productivity by dint of rationalization of facilities was 
not the only factor which contributed to the reduction of the cost of a 
vessel. 
Table 8. Com~arative National 









United States 323 
Denmark 119 
Belgium lJO 
CD Source: Shipping, No. 360. 
® Taken 1956. 
In the shipbuilding industry, where by 
its nature, order-production is the usual fonn 
and mass production are not easy to get 
and the cost of wage has a great influence 
on competitive positions. The wage cost 
in Japan is much cheaper than that of 
every shipbuilding country ranging from 
the U. S. A. to Holland as shown in Table 
8. In order to make this low wage cost 
even cheaper, capitalist has never failed to 
make every effort which has no direct con-
nection with the rise of productivity. The 
first was to increase the number of, not 
the regular workers, but temporary or extra 
workers and contract workers under inferior 
conditions. Table 5 above shows that, in spite of the rapid rise of output 
temporary workers and especially contract workers have increased in great 
numbers whereas there is almost no increase in regular workers. 
Moreover, in proportion to above mentioned rapid increase in output 
the relative increase in the number of workers as a whole was too small, 
although the number of contract workers had increased greatly and even if, 
. the rise in labour productivity is overestimated, it is easy to imagine that 
there was "labour intensification," through such measures such as the ticket 
system for work units, regulation of overtime, cuts in rest hours and so on. 
It is easily supposed that the above mentioned rapid increase in production 
and the drastic decrease in the number of working hours per unit of output 
were for the greater part attributable to "labour intensification." 
Again, the introduction of welding has, indeed played a great role in 
saving steel materials but it should be also emphasised that this has become 
more effective in combining with "labour intensification" which made wor-
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kers more careful not to produce "scrap" or defective products. 
And in spite of the rise in productivity, there was an extension of 
working hours as shown in Table 6. 212.5 hours a month means about 2 
hours over-time every day on the average and these long hours are rare in 
other industries. 
The average monthly income of workers has recently increased nominally. 
This is supposed to be due, not to the rise of wage-level, but to the augu-
mentation of the factor of an efficiency rating system and to the extension 
of working hours. The increase in real wages is doubtful. 
Thus, the rationalization put forth under the name of the movement 
for improvement of productivity, indeed has contributed to the reduction of 
cost and has made possible due to the great number of ships for export, 
the revival and growth of the shipbuilding monopolies, but it should be 
remembered that it has brought labourer only instability of employment, 
i. e., the increase of contract and temporary workers, extension of working 
hours and" labour intensification." 
Lastly, I will add a word concerning the relationship with small and 
medium-sized enterprises in its effort in the reduction of cost. 
As is well known, the shipbuilding industry is an assembly industry and 
the related industrial products in a narrow sense occupy more than 45% of 
the cost of a vessel, and those in a wide sense including steel and timber 
materials amount to as high as 70% or so. 
The problem in question is that of small and medium-sized enterprises 
whose products are such related products as generator engines, auxiliary 
machinery, refrigerators, valves and cocks, nautical instruments, navigational 
apparatus, shipping goods and so on. These products form about 17 to 30 % 
of the cost of a vessel. 
Among these small and medium-sized enterprises, there are some in 
sub-contract relationships and others in merely finished goods placement 
relationships, and among them, there are some in line with the parent 
company, through sub-contractor associations and others not so. 
sub-contracting takes place sometimes in the form of contract for work 
within the yard with above-mentioned contract workers, and sometimes in 
the form of contracts for related products usually called "sub-:Jontracted 
manufacturing." The ratio of these sub-contracts differ according to the 
yard and also the period, but it is estimated from the actual amount of 
shipbuilding which is far above the tempo of decrease of working hours per 
unit and the increase in the number of workers in the shipyards, that the 
placement of orders with these small businesses has increased generally. It may 
be mentioned that Table 9 shows the augumentation of the degree of depen-
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dence upon sub-contracts among the three monopolistic shipbuilding companies. 
Table 9. Three Main Companies, Sub-contract Ratio 
I Year I~ Sub-contract Factories I No. of received Orders (index) 
i{ 1954 142 100 
A. Company I 55 185 193.4 
II ,,:: 197 770.3 383 100 






1954 140 100 
C. Company 55 I 161 162.3 
56 I 189 386.7 
Note: Labour Ministry. Research Bureau; Labour Monthly Statistical Reports, 
Vol. 9. No. 12. 
Towards these small and medium-sized businesses in sub-contract relations 
and in "outside order placement" relations, the shipbuilding monopoly has 
been forcing its policy of cost reduction in such forms as beating down the 
price consistently, taking advantage of their " cut throat competition," defer-
ment of payments, reduction of unit cost of sub-contracted products and etc. 
The details of the above situation can be ommitted here, as there have 
been many investigations including those made by the Board of Small 
Businesses. 
At any rate, it is worth mentioning that the building of export vessels 
which made possible the revival of post-war monopolies has been accomplished 
with the inheritance from the "Imperial Navy" and the adhesion to giant 
banks, as well as the exploitation of workers and small businesses through such 
extensive rationalization. l " 
m 
With the progress of rationalization, the revival of shipbuilding monopoly 
involves the reinforcement of combinations between big shipping and banking 
concerns and its advance into other industries. 
The big shipbuilding companies which was forced to compete with each 
other in a narrower domestic market after the war, must first of all revive 
and reinforce the combination with shipping firms which belonged to the 
former same Konzern or the traditional connection with them existing before 
the war, in order to augment and stablize the amount of orders. 
On the other hand, this industry which demands large amounts of funds 
10) For details see author's book (K. Echigo; Japanese Shipbuilding Industry) 
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cannot but depend on banking capital in the process of rapid rationalization 
after the war and above all, the dependence upon banks in the same former 
Zaibatsu Konzern or leading banks in transactions for borrowing funds at a 
high ratio has become indispensable. The trend towards this situation is 
.shown in Table 10. The ratio of governmental funds have increased recently 
and this is supposed to reflect the increase of loans from the Export and 
Import Bank of Japan, in proportion to the increase of export vessels. 
Table 10. Big Shipbuilding Companies and Banks--Financial Grouping--
I I Period I Chief I 
Chief I Other 
I 
Gov't I Old Big Companies Bank Bank Bank Fund Special Ratio Ratio Banks 
1. Mitsubishi Shipbuilding i{ 1953 Mitc;u- 24.5%1 6.50/0 19.8% 20.4% 
& Engineering. I sep. bishi I 1956 1/ 12.2 2.5 69.3 9.7 
2. Mitsubishi Heavy-Industries, ! f 1953 1/ 19.2 3.3 8.8 15.4 
reorganized. )11956 1/ 16.2 4.9 22.6 18.1 I 
{ 1953 1/ 26.3 2.6 6.2 16.1 3. Mltsubishi ~ippon Heavy-Industries. 
1956 1/ 19.8 7.9 22.5 12.0 




- i - 61.0 22.0 
Daiichi 18.2 - 42.9 16.7 
5. Kawasaki Dockyard Co. r: 1/ 9.8 - 61.1 12.2 1953 1/ 44.1 - 7.9 4.7 6. Ishikawajima Heavy-Industries. 
1956 1/ 16.7 
-
46.9 5.8 
If 1953 1/ 22.9 - 44.9 4.7 
7. U raga Dock Co. 
111956 1/ 10.4 - 62.1 5.8 
8. Harima Shipbuilding f 1953 1/ 39.0 - 9.5 -
& Engineering. 1 1956 1/ 5.6 - 77.7 7.5 
9. Hitachi Shipbuilding { 1953 Sanwa 28.2 - 24.2 15.7 
& Engineering. 1956 1/ 9.3 - 40.5 23.9 
Note; Fair Trade, 1957, January, 
Also in the shipping industry, the connection of shipping companies 
with chief banks has become tighter than in pre-war days, because the funds 
for enlarging its fleet must be provided by loans from banks, cooperatively 
supplied by governmental loans. 
Thus, there are naturally tighter combinations among the three, that is, 
shipbuilding·· ·shipping, shipping··· banking, shipbuilding··· banking. This, for 
example, is indicated in the following drastic features which appeared in 
the Shipbuilding Program up to the 13 tho 
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Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, out of its total of 45 
vessels built received orders for 12 from N. Y. K., 8 from Daido Marine 
Transportation Company, 3 from Mitsubishi Shipping Company, 5 from Toho 
Shipping Company, Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy-Industries Company, out of its 
total of 23, 8 from N. Y. K., 5 from Mitsubishi Shipping Company, Mitsu-
bishi Heavy-Industries, Reorganized Company, out of 25, 16 from O. S. K., 
4 from Shin Nippon Steamship Company respectively. 
On the other hand these three Mitsubishi Companies monopolized 20 
out of the 21 for N. Y. K. while the Mitsubishi Heavy-Industries, Reorganized. 
built all 16 for Osaka Shosen Kaisha (0. S. K.) and the Mitsubishi Shipping 
Company ordered 9 vessels which were monopolized by the three Mitsubish 
Companies. 
In the case of the Mitsui Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, out 
of a total of 28 vessels built, 17 were ordered by the Mitsui Steamship 
Company and 3 were from the Meiji Shipping Company which belongs to the 
Mitsui interests. Again, the Mitsui Shipbuilding and Engineering Company 
monopolized a total of 17 orders from the Mitsui Steamship Company and 
also vessels of the Meiji Shipping Company and Inui Steamship Company 
were ordered to Mitsui Shipbuilding and Engineering Compang or Fujinagata 
Shipbuilding Company which belong to the same Konzern, respectively. 
In the case of the Kawasaki Dockyard Company, in the Daiichi Bank 
group, out of its total of 21 vessels built, 10 were ordered from Kawasaki 
Kisen Kaisha and 2 from Nittetsu Steamship Company in the Daiichi Bank 
group. On the contrary, Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha built all of its vessels at 
the Kawasaki Dockyard Company. 
Harima Shipbuilding and Engineering Company out of its total of 22 
vessels, 5 were for lino Kaiun Kaisha in the same Daiichi Bank group and 
3 each for Nitto Shosen Company and Terukuni Kaiun Company; respecti-
vely. 
Ishikawajima Heavy-Industries Company has no particular shipowners it 
seems but out of its total of 9 vessels, 2 were built for Kyoritsu Steamship 
Company and Nittetsu Steamship Company respectively. 
To these three shipbuilding companies known to belong to the Daiichi 
Bank group, orders from shipping companies in the same .group for in-
stance, in the case of lino Lines, 11 out of 16 including those built at lino 
Heavy-Industries Company and 7 out of 8 for the Nitto Shosen Company. 
The Hitachi Shipbuilding and Engineering Company in the Sanwa 
Group, out of its total of 35 vessels built received orders for 11 from 
Yamashita Steamship Company, 5 from Ocean Transportation Shipping Co., 
6 from Shin Nippon Steemship Co., all in Sanwa group Shipping Companies. 
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On the other hand, Yamashita Steamship Co. ordered 11 out of 12, Ocean 
Transportation Co. all 5 to the Hitachi Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Company. 
The Japan Steel & Tube Company in the Fuji Bank group built 6, 
out of its total of 17, for Nissan Kisen Kaisha which, on the other hand 
ordered 6 out of 8 to Japan Steel & Tube Co. 
As shown above, the connection between shipbuilding and shipping 
industries through orders and construction is tight especially among big businesses 
such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui which belonged to former Zaibatsu Konzern 
and also is fairly clear among other big Companies. 
And such connections are, it must be noticed not limited only to mono-
polistic shipbuilding companies and giant shipping Companies. The reason 
is as follows. 
The post-war domestic position of pre-war big shipping companies that is 
leading or dominant operators, has declined because of the loss of accumul-
ation of funds caused by the withdrawal of government indemnification of 
war losses and because of the restriction according to the principle of equal 
allocation in the Shipbuilding Program. The degree of concentration of 
tonnage owned by them, as shown in Table 11, is extremely small compared 
to that of pre-war days. On the other hand, other small owners of pre-war 
Table 11. Concentration ratio of Ships held 
I I (A) Pre-war Total Tonnage 
I 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 635,284 
Osaka Shosen Kaisha 512,307 
Kokusai Kisen Kaisha 160.992 
Kinkai Yusen Kaisha 153,706 
Mitsui Bussan 149,690 
Total 1,611,929 
Grand total 2,601,863 
I (B) Post-war Total Tonnage I 
lino Kaium Kaisha 237,795 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 208,640 
Osaka Shosen Kaisha 191,967 
Mitsui Steamship Go. 188,524 
Nitta Shosen Co. 120,709 
Total 947,635 
Grand Total 3,724,645 
Note: CD Pre-war 1937, 1,000 g. t. over. 
® Post-war 1956, 100 g. t. over. 
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days so-called, "one vessel owner," found it difficult to build new ships 
because of the rise in the price of vessels. 
Thus, the leading operators, who have connections with banks but cannot 
build ships because of the limits in the Shipbuilding Program, have worked 
out a device by which to charter and operate the newly built ships of small 
owners for the construction of which the operator has introduced his bank, 
guaranteed the loan and provided the facilities of dockyards. 
In this way, the scale of owners becomes large, and as the Shipbuilding 
Program goes on, the so-called grouping, headed by the dominant operator, 
has gone on inevitably. For example, this trend as to N. Y. K., O. S. K. 
and Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha is shown in Chart 3. Those III (A) are 
companies in groupings in the management of which the parent company 
participates, and in (B) are companies in groupings in a wide sense with 
which the parent company has a business connection through the above 









-Yokohama Foreign Trade and Building Co. I-Toho Shipping Co. 
-Shinko Milling Co, .-Hachiuma Kisen Kaisha 
-Sanyo Tradin~ Co. I-Kyoritsu Kisen Kaisha 
-Chiyoda Tradmg and Foods Co. -Pacific Shipping Co. 
-Nippon Cleaning Co. -Tokyo Senpaku Kaisha 
-Yokohama Building and Restaurants -Okada Shooen Kaisha 
- Taiya Printing Co. -Hinomaru Kisen Kaisha 
-Otaru Harbor Work. 1-K yoei Tanker Co, 
1--------------- -··-~-;-yamamoto Kisen Kaisha 
-Sankyo Transport Co. 
-Mizukawa Trading Co. 
-Yusen Transport Warehouse 
-Hichiyo Electric Co. 
-Prest Industrial Co. 
-Homma Shipping Works. 
'-Toei Shipping Industries. 
(A) 
11-l'iPPOn Shosen Kaisha 
-Tokyo Yusen Kaisha 
-Kyodo Shipping Co. 
- Taiheiyo Shipping Industries. 
-Kinkai Yusen Kaisha 
-Handa Company 
-Ocean Steamship Co. 
-Maruei Kisen Kaisha 
(B) 
-'Kipponkai Kisen Kaisha I-Sanko Steamship Co. 
I
-Daiichi Kisen Kaisha '-Tarnai Shosen Kaisha 
-Kinkai Shosen Transport Co. I-Sawayama Kisen Kaisha 1-Tozai Harbor Shipping Co. - Tozai Kisen Kaisha 
I-Shosen Harbor Shipping Co. 1-Daiko Transport Co. 
1
'-KitaNiPpon Warehouse Harbor ShippingCo.l-Awanokuni Kisen Kaisha 
I 
Kusakabe Kisen Kaisha 
_1_Naka Nippon Warehouse Co. -Ikeda Shoji Kaisha 
-Kaiyo Travel Co. -Aisan Shosen Kaisha 
I-Japan Express Co. I-Osaka Shipping Co. 
-Daito Paints Co. -Asahi Tankers Co. 
I-Nishi Nippon Electric Co. I-Hokoku Shipbuilding Co. 
I-Osaka Building Co. - Tomishima Shipping Co. 
-Shooen Shokusan Kaisha 




Chart -3 cont. 
(A) (B) 
-Ocean Transport Co. 
-Miyaji Kisen Kaisha 
-Nippo Shipping Co. 
-Rara Shosen Kaisha 
-Sadonokuni Kisen Kaisha 
- Daito Transport Co. 
-Nitta Transport Co. 
-Heiwa Kisen Kaisha 
1--------- -Shinko Shosen Kaisha 
-Seiko Shoji Kaisha - Asahi Kisen Kaisha 
-Kippon Kisen Kaisha 
- Fuso Shipping Co. 
-Hashimoto Kisen Kaisha 
-Kobe Kikyo Kaisha 
-Goyo Kisen Kaisha 
-Nitta Shooen Co. 
Note: (A) Proper group company 
(B) Management or business relationship 
Now, if we look at this situation of the grouping of owners by the 
dominant operator, from the side of the big shipbuilding companies which 
combines with the operator, it can be said that the big shipbuilding companies 
can now surely receive the orders for construction from not only the operator 
but also from owners in the same group. Thus, the reorganization of shipping 
circles is, in this sense, simultaneously related to the expansion and stability 
of the market fOf shipbuilding monopolies. 
As we have shown above, the grouping in the shipping industry has 
gone on inevitably. Then, what are the relationships between, giant ship-
building corporations and small and medium shipbuilding companies? 
Generally speaking, monopolistic corporations wh ich suffered from excess 
capacity, could not afford to form its own group to utilize small and medium-
sized shipyards. Therefore, the grouping in shipbuilding circles was rare 
except in such cases as Mitsui and Fujinagata, both of which belong to the 
same Konzern or Ishikawajima and Tokyo Shipbuilding Company which 
already had connections from the outset. There are however, some move-
ments towards grouping, due to a large amount of orders for export vessels 
after 1955 such as Urage Dock Co. which helped to rebuild and which 
participated in the management of Nipponkai Heavy-Industries Co., Tohoku 
Shipbuiliding Co. and Miura Shipbuilding Co., But this did not prove to be 
a general trend. 
In contrast to this, there are marked trends towards· the advance of 
monopolistic shipbuilding companies for many-sided production and the par-
ticipation in the management of industries other than shipbuilding. Chart 4 
shows the compames In which monopolistic companies participates. 
Chart 4. 
( I ) 
-Mitsubishi Fuso -Hokkaido Fuso Motors Company 
Mitsu bishi - K yushu Fusa" 11 
Nippon - Automobiles ---I Minami Kyushu 11 " 
Heavy-Industries -Nagoya Fuso" " 




_" Air Craft DivislOn" --Nippon Jet Engine Co. 
-Hishiwa Motor Agency 
-Kyushu Nakaju Motors 
-Nagoya Nakaju Motors 
Mitsubishi Heavy-
Industries, Reorg.-
_u Motor Sales Agency" - -Osaka Shinhishi Motors 
-Tokyo Nakaju Motors 
-Okayama Nakaju Motors 
-Hokkaido Nakaju Motors 
" Machinery - Toyo Seisaku Sho 





I-Seibu Shinhishi Farm Machineries 
--Tokyo Industrial 
I-Chubu Shinhishi Farm Machinery 
(UI) 
Mitsubishi S B ·Id· C Sh· b ·ld· 1- anyu UI mg o. 
& 'EP~' '~g - -Hishiei Real Estate Co. ngmeermg 
(IV) 
Sh· b '·ld -Hitachi Machines Co. 
H' tach' I-Hitachi Innoshima Kaikan 
& ~ ~I l~g - -Onami Transport Warehouse 
ngmeenng _ Taguma Shipbuilding Co, 
(V) 
-Japan Mehinite Metal Co. 
Mitsui I-Tokyo Mehinite Foundry Co. 
ShiPbUilding--I-Mikuni Mehinite Co. 
& Engieering I - Takatori Seisaku sho 
-Sanyu Real Estate Co. 






-Kawasaki Steel Co. 
_ Kawasaki Kisen Kasiha 
I-Kawasaki Air Craft Co. 
·-Kawasaki Rolling Stock Co. 
-Kippon Kisen Co. 
I-Kawasaki Real Estate Co. 
~ Kawasaki Trading Co. 
I-Shin :[\;aniwa Dock Co. 1-Yokkaichi Seisaku Sho 




So-called U Kawasaki Hevay-Industries Konzern." 
Group Company from Kawasaki Dockyard Co. 
Shinko I-Kure Heavy-Industries. 
Group 
: I-Kure Shipyard-Kure Oxygen Co. 
Harima -1- -Harima Building Contractors Co. 
Shipbuilding & I-Kotobuki Sangyo Co. 
Engineering. -Kishima Dock Co. 
(VIII) 
I
-Urga Tamruhima Diesel Industries. 
-Tokyo Machineries. 
I-Nippon Rivetting Nails Co . 
. -Sagarni Industries. 
I-Tokyo Tokushu Kako Co. 
Uraga Dock Co. -i-Nihonkai Heavy-Industries. 
1
- Tohoku Shipbuilding Co. 
-Kusakabe Industrial. 
:-Miura Shipbuilding Co. 
i-Nagoya Shipbuilding Co. 
-Sankyo Metals Co. 




Chart 4. continued 
: I-Ishikawajima, Shibaura Turbine-Shibaura Machinery Co. 
: - -Tokyo Shipbuilding Co. 
Ishikawajima I I-Ishikawajima Coaling Co. 
Heavy-Industries.- - -Shin Tachikawa Air Craft Co. 
Isuzu' 
Motors. 
-Maruishi Industrial Co. 
- Hirai Seisaku Sho 
--Tokyo Kogyo 
-Chiba Warehouse 
-Kyokuto Trading Co. 
-Nippon Jet Engine Co. 
Of course, they engage in various business from trading to manufacturing 
and the scope and scale of participation is different according to the com-
panies but roughly, they can be divided into Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and 
Engineering type and the Drage Dock type. Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Co. has a few companies in its group in which it participates. 
They are Sanyu Building Co. and Hishiei Real Estate Co. which are 
independent divisions for welfare facilities. The same type is seen in the 
other two Mitsubishi companies and in the Hitachi Shipbuilding and Eng-
ineering Company. In the case of the Mitsubishi Heavy-Industries Reorga-
nized, Co., the companies in this group are apparently many but they are 
chiefly in trading business and a few in manufacturing. On the contrary, 
the Draga Dock Co. has companies of various kinds in its group, all of 
which are in manufacturing. The same can be said of Ishikawajima Heavy-
Industries Co. 
These differences in scope and scale of management participation in 
enterprises other than shipbuilding have some relationship with the many-
sided production which the big shipbuilding company operates within itself. 
The reason why the three Mitsubishi companies are slow in grouping seems-
to reflect the development of manyoosided production within them; they can 
produce not only the products which other firms might order outside but 
also such products as general machinary, iron frames, rolling stock, which 
have no direct relation to ships and also reflect the power of the Konzern 
in that they can be purchased cheaper outside than other firms even if they 
do not share in the capital. In such combined heavy .industrial capital as· 
Mitsubishi Heavy-Industries Reorg. the tempo of the rise in output is much 
faster in other branches than in the Shipbuilding branch. Then again the 
relationship between Drage Dock Co. and Ishikawajima Heavy- Industries Co. 
to their machinery manufacturing companies in their groupings; the Ka-
wasaki Dockyard case, and also the relationship of Mitsui Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Company to Showa Air Craft Co. may be looked upon as being 
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~imilar to the relationships existing within the Mitsubishi Heavy-Industries, 
Reorg. in which some have independent manageffiont or capital is shared 
in other divisions and enterprises. 
At any rate, the narrowne~s of the domestic market and the instability 
of the market makes the groupings in the shipbuilding industry stagnant 
and at the same time, the same causes make shipbuilding companies actively 
advance towards many-sided production and towards the control of enterprises 
or grouping in other industries. Thus, strengthening itself as general heavy 
industrial capital or in the development of the forn;.ation of Konzerns wi th 
~hipbuilding as its core. 
In the foregoing pages, I have made an analysis focusing on the ration-
alization and groupings(formation of Konzern)which were the primary factors 
in the revival and development of post-war monopolies in the shipbuilding 
industry, Lastly, I shall make some comments on the latest trends. 
The post-war increase in shipbuilding capacity and the weakened and 
narrowed domestic market, have necessarily promoted the rationalization and 
grouping in other industries. It is a well known fact that rationalization 
has the contrary effect of enlarging the shipbuilding capacity and the recent 
fall in shipping markets have disclosed the weakness in Japanese shipping. 
Therefore, monopolistic shipbuilding companies must more and more depend 
·upon foreign markets. But the recent over-all depression in shipping has 
greatly diminished the amount of newly received orders and also has often 
had cancellations of orders and changes in the contents of contracts. 
On the other hand, facing the decreased amount of orders for export 
.ships, attempts to stabilize and secure foreign markets by getting more orders 
from stable international oil trusts, instead of orders from speculative Greek 
.ship owners and attempts by Ishikawajima, Kawaski and Hitachi Companies 
to export capital to underdeveloped countries such as Brazil, Portugal and 
India are seen and the strengthening of many-sided production and of 
combination among the same Konzern or grouping are made inevitable. The 
establishment of an export committee through the cooperation of Mitsubishi 
-Companies is a typical example. 
Moreover, a noteworthy fact is the growth of cooperative efforts for 
Tesearch in nuclear-powered ships, shown in HIJAP (Hitachi-lino Joint 
.Atomic Panel) and the Daiichi Atomic Energy Research Group by the 
Daiichi Bank group including Kawasaki Dockyard Co. as pointing towards 
:new trends in cooperation and grouping. 
